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Introduction

Michael S. Knoll is the Theodore Warner
Professor at the University of Pennsylvania
Carey Law School, professor of real estate at
The Wharton School, and co-director for the
Center for Tax Law and Policy at the University
of Pennsylvania. Ruth Mason is the Edwin S.
Cohen Distinguished Professor of Law and
Taxation at the University of Virginia School of
Law.
Thanks to Bruce Ely, John Swain, and Steve
Wlodychak for comments and suggestions and
to Griffin Peeples and Paul Riermaier for
assistance with the research.
This article is an abbreviated version of an
article forthcoming in volume 39 of Virginia Tax
Review.
In this article, the authors discuss Steiner v.
Utah and how Utah could revise its tax system
to satisfy the Constitution.
Copyright 2020 Michael S. Knoll and
Ruth Mason. All rights reserved.

In an earlier article in this publication,1 we
argued that the Utah Supreme Court failed to
follow and correctly apply clear U.S. Supreme
Court precedent in Steiner v. Utah2 when the Utah
high court held that an internally inconsistent and
discriminatory state tax regime did not violate the
dormant commerce clause. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court recently declined certiorari in
3
Steiner, but the issue is unlikely to go away. Not
every state high court will defy the U.S. Supreme
Court by refusing to apply the dormant
commerce clause, and so the Court will sooner or
later likely find itself facing conflicting
interpretations of the dormant foreign commerce
clause. Accordingly, in this article we address an
issue that we did not cover in our earlier article:
how Utah could revise its tax system to satisfy the
Constitution.
The Case: Steiner v. Utah
As we explained at greater length in our first
article on Steiner, the challenged Utah tax regime
is internally inconsistent, and hence it
unconstitutionally violates the dormant foreign
commerce clause. First introduced in 1983 in
4
Container Corp., and emphatically reinforced in
5
2015 in Wynne, the internal consistency test
requires a court evaluating a dormant commerce
clause challenge to a state tax to assume that all
other jurisdictions (typically depicted as a single
hypothetical jurisdiction) adopt the challenged
1

Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason, “Why the Supreme Court Should
Grant Certiorari in Steiner v. Utah,” Tax Notes State, Feb. 3, 2020, p. 377.
2
3

449 P.3d 189 (Utah 2019).
Steiner v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2020 WL 871753 (Mem).

4

Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 169
(1983).
5

Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 575 U.S.___, 135 S.
Ct. 1787 (2015).
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state’s tax system. The court then asks — under
these conditions of hypothetical harmonization
— if cross-border commerce would be taxed
more heavily than in-state commerce. If crossborder commerce is taxed more heavily, then the
tax discriminates, and it will almost always be
struck down.
Despite the Utah Supreme Court’s
protestations to the contrary, it is straightforward
to apply the internal consistency test to Utah’s
6
system of cross-border taxation. Utah imposes a
flat income tax of 5 percent on both the
worldwide income of residents and the Utah
income of nonresidents, including residents of
7
other countries. Although Utah provides its
residents with credits for source taxes assessed
8
by other U.S. states, it does not credit source
9
taxes assessed in other countries.
As we noted in our prior article, when we
apply the internal consistency test to Utah’s tax
regime for taxing foreign income, we assume that
all subnational taxing jurisdictions adopt the
Utah regime. Thus, assume a Canadian province,
10
say Ontario, adopts the Utah tax system.
Ontario would tax Ontario residents at 5 percent
on their worldwide income, and it would tax
nonresidents at 5 percent on their income earned
in Ontario. Like Utah, Ontario would credit taxes
assessed by fellow provinces, but not taxes
assessed abroad. Hence, residents of Utah would
be taxed at 5 percent on their income earned in
Utah and at 10 percent on their income earned in
Ontario. Similarly, residents of Ontario would be
6

The Utah Tax Court applied the internal consistency test to the facts
in Steiner quickly, correctly, and with no fuss. Steiner v. Utah State Tax
Commission, No. 170901774, at 6-7 (Utah Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2018).
7

The Utah statutory income tax rate is a flat 4.95 percent; from 2008
through 2017, it was a flat 5 percent. Official Utah Income Tax
Information. Throughout this article, we use a 5 percent rate for
simplicity.
8

The credit is available under Utah Code section 59-10-1003. This
credit makes the Utah regime internally consistent regarding interstate
income. The Utah regime is only internally inconsistent in its treatment
of foreign income.
9

Utah Code section 59-10-115 allows “an adjustment to adjusted
gross income of a resident or nonresident individual [who] would
otherwise . . . suffer a double tax detriment under this part,” but the
Utah tax administration denied the Steiners equitable relief.
10

Under the Canada-U.S. Tax Treaty, which took effect in 1984, the
U.S. taxes covered by the treaty are the federal income tax and some
excise taxes on private foundations, and in limited circumstances Social
Security taxes. State taxes are not covered. Similarly, in Canada, only
Canadian federal taxes are covered. Any taxes imposed on behalf of
Canada’s subnational governments are not covered. Canada-U.S. Tax
Treaty, Article II (1984).
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taxed at 5 percent on their income earned in
Ontario and at 10 percent on their income earned
in Utah. Accordingly, because cross-border
income is taxed more heavily (10 percent) than
income earned in the residence jurisdiction (5
percent), the Utah tax is internally inconsistent
regarding foreign income. Thus, the Utah tax is
discriminatory, and the Utah Supreme Court
should have struck it down. Table 1 illustrates the
result.
Table 1: Utah’s Tax Treatment of Income Earned
Abroad Is Internally Inconsistent
Residence
Utah

Ontario

Utah

5%

10%

Ontario

10%

5%

Source

In sum, the Utah tax regime is internally
inconsistent and thus discriminates between instate and foreign commerce. It therefore violates
the commerce clause and should be struck down,
unless the state can justify its discrimination,
which it has not tried to do. Accordingly, to
comply with the U.S. Constitution, Utah must
amend its tax law.
Designing a Constitutional State Tax of
Foreign Income
In this part, we consider how Utah could
revise its tax treatment of foreign income to make
it internally consistent, and therefore compliant
with the dormant commerce clause. Utah has
available to it a wide variety of options for curing
the constitutional infirmity in its tax regime, and
they fall into three major patterns:
apportionment, rate recalibration, and tax
credits. We present examples from all three
groups that would satisfy the internal
consistency test.
Apportionment
One way that Utah could satisfy the internal
consistency test would be by moving away from
using separate accounting and arm’s-length
pricing and toward adopting a system that
apportioned income across jurisdictions. At one
point in the proceedings, the Steiners proposed a
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hybrid tax system that would combine both
separate accounting and apportionment. The
Steiners proposed that Utah apportion their
foreign income among the U.S. states in the same
manner that Utah apportions corporate income
among the states, and tax only that portion
11
allocated thereby to Utah. Under the Steiners’
proposal, Utah would continue to use separate
accounting to allocate to itself Utahns’ Utahsource income and the Utah-source income of
foreign residents. The state would then add to
income a share of their foreign income
determined by calculating a weighted average of
their property, payroll, and sales in Utah as
compared to their property, payroll, and sales in
the United States. This approach obviously fails
internal consistency because under hypothetical
harmonization, foreign income would be taxed
both where it is earned and where the owner
resides, whereas there would be only one level of
tax when income was earned in the country
12
where the owner resides. Thus, the Steiners’
proposed apportionment system could not save
Utah’s tax system.
In contrast with the Steiners’ apportionment
proposal, there are two apportionment methods
that Utah could adopt that would satisfy the
internal consistency test without having to
change its tax rates. These methods are:
• Option 1. Domestic apportionment. Utah
could apportion only domestic income
across the states.
• Option 2. Worldwide apportionment. Utah
could apportion worldwide income across
the globe.
Option 1: Domestic Apportionment
Although the Steiners’ suggestion is similar
to the method that Utah (and many other states)
uses to apportion corporate income for tax
purposes, their proposal is not internally

consistent because it assigns all domestic income
to domestic jurisdictions and also apportions all
foreign income among domestic jurisdictions. In
contrast, a tax system that apportioned domestic
income among the 50 states and exempted
foreign income from U.S. taxation would be
internally consistent. If universalized, such a
system would tax all income only in the country
where it was earned. Although such a system
would be constitutional, all foreign income
earned by Utahns would be excluded from the
13
Utah tax base.
Option 2: Worldwide Apportionment
The Steiners’ suggestion also bears some
resemblance to California’s worldwide taxation
of unitary businesses that the Supreme Court
14
twice upheld, but which California has since
retreated from in the face of heavy foreign
15
pressure. The two methods, however, are not
equivalent. Under the California method
approved by the Court, the state first calculated a
unitary taxpayer’s worldwide income and then
apportioned that income to California using a
weighted average of the worldwide
apportionment factors (property, payroll, and
sales).
The weighted average compares a taxpayer’s
California presence to its worldwide presence.
Such a system is internally consistent because
under hypothetical harmonization all income is
taxed once and only once. The unitary income
was divided among jurisdictions according to the
relative presence in each jurisdiction of the
unitary business’s factors of production. Under
this approach, Utah would be able to tax its
proportional share of the foreign income of
Utahns, but Utah would also have to exempt the
share of Utah income of residents that was
allocable elsewhere under the formula.16

13

11

Utah apportions corporate income by calculating a corporation’s
U.S. income (its foreign income is excluded) and then apportioning
income to Utah by calculating a weighted average of the apportionment
factors (property, payroll, and sales in Utah divided by total U.S.
property, payroll, and sales) and multiplying the corporation’s U.S.
income by the weighted average of its Utah apportionment factors. This
method compares a taxpayer’s Utah presence to its U.S. presence.
12

The Steiners’ proposal would still fail internal consistency if their
foreign income was apportioned using worldwide rather than U.S.factor shares. In that case, some cross-border income would be taxed
twice, whereas domestic income would still be taxed once.

Of course, such a system would mean that Utah would forgo its
practice of taxing Utahns’ income earned in other states and granting
Utahns a credit for taxes paid to the other states.
14

See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298
(1994); and Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159.
15

See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 306 (noting that California and other
states that required worldwide reporting had amended their combined
reporting regimes to allow election of a “water’s edge” treatment that
confines apportionment to U.S.-source income).
16

As with domestic apportionment, such a system would mean that
Utah would forgo taxing Utahns’ income earned in other states and
granting a credit for taxes paid to other states.
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Rate Recalibration
As described above, Utah could satisfy the
internal consistency test and maintain its rate
structure without granting tax credits by
adopting either domestic or worldwide
apportionment. Such an approach, however,
would end Utah’s practice of assigning income to
a jurisdiction using separate accounting and the
arm’s-length principle. Because switching to
apportionment would constitute a fundamental
change in its tax system for individuals, we next
describe the two approaches available to Utah
that maintain separate accounting.
Utah could reconfigure the rates of its tax
system so that under internal consistency, the tax
on Utah-source income earned by Utahns (that is,
domestic tax) was no higher than the
combination of the tax on Utahns’ economic
activities abroad (outbound tax) plus the tax on
foreign residents’ economic activities in Utah
(inbound tax). Its goal, in amending its rate
structure to comply with the dormant foreign
commerce clause, would be to satisfy the
following tax rate condition:
Td ≥ To+ Ti– (To x Ti)
Td, or the domestic tax, is Utah’s tax on
Utahns’ in-state income; To, or the outbound tax is
Utah’s tax on Utahns’ foreign-source income, and
Ti, or the inbound tax, is Utah’s tax rate on
nonresident aliens’ in-state income.17
Although there are infinitely many
combinations of these three rates that would
satisfy internal consistency, we note the
following three options because each involves
changing only one of the three tax rates as
compared with Utah’s current system.
• Option 3. Eliminate the Outbound Tax.
Utah could lower the outbound tax to zero.
In other words, it could exclude Utah
residents’ foreign-source income.
• Option 4. Eliminate the Inbound Tax. Utah
could also eliminate the inbound tax on
foreign residents who earn income in the
state. Utah could continue to tax the foreign

income of residents, along with the
domestic income of residents, but forgo
taxing the in-state income of foreign
residents.
• Option 5. Increase the Domestic Tax Rate.
Utah could alternatively increase the tax
rate on the in-state income of Utah residents
to eliminate the current regime’s excess
burden on cross-border commerce.
Option 3: Eliminate the Outbound Tax
The simplest approach toward foreign
income and the most straightforward to examine
is an exclusion of Utahns’ foreign-source income.
Such a cross-border tax system is sometimes
called territorial taxation or exemption, and, as
can be readily seen, it is internally consistent. If
Utah were to exclude residents’ foreign income,
and if Ontario were assumed to adopt the same
tax system as Utah (as the internal consistency
test calls for), then residents of Utah and
residents of Ontario would both be taxed at 5
percent wherever they earn income. No one
would be taxed at home on income earned in the
other country. Because the total tax rate would be
5 percent regardless of where one earned income,
such a Utah tax would be internally consistent.
Moreover, although Utah’s tax treatment of
income earned by Utah residents in other U.S.
states would differ from its tax treatment of
income earned by Utah residents in foreign
countries, there should be no tension between
them because they both work with Utah having a
tax rate of 5 percent on Utahns’ in-state income.18
Option 4: Eliminate the Inbound Tax
Alternatively, Utah could eliminate its
discrimination against foreign commerce
without changing its tax treatment of Utahns’
domestic or foreign income if Utah were willing
to forgo taxing the Utah income of foreign
residents. Such a tax is internally consistent
because in the hypothetical harmonization
Ontario would not tax Utahns’ Ontario income
and hence taxation of foreign income would only
occur in the state of residence and at the same rate
as for in-state income. Moreover, such a tax

17

See Knoll and Mason, “The Economic Foundations of the Dormant
Commerce Clause,” 103 Va. L. Rev. 309, 323 (2017); and Ryan Lirette and
Alan D. Viard, “Putting the Commerce Back in the Dormant Commerce
Clause: State Taxes, State Subsidies, and Commerce Neutrality,” 24 J. of
L. & Pol’y 467, 483 (2016).
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18

This would be so if Utah retained the tax credit available under
current law for source taxes assessed by other U.S. states.
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system, although different from the treatment of
income earned in other U.S. states, can exist
alongside a full credit for taxes paid to other U.S.
states without creating tension because both
systems are internally consistent with the same
tax rate on Utahns’ in-state income.
Option 5: Increase the Domestic Tax Rate
Every taxpayer bringing a dormant
commerce clause challenge against a state tax
hopes that the remedy will be a refund of tax. But
discrimination can be cured not only by
refunding taxes to the group that experienced
discrimination, but also by increasing the taxes of
the favored group. As the Supreme Court
observed in Wynne:
Whenever government impermissibly
treats like cases differently, it can cure the
violation by either “leveling up” or
“leveling down.” Whenever a State
impermissibly taxes interstate commerce
at a higher rate than intrastate commerce,
that infirmity could be cured by lowering
the higher rate, raising the lower rate, or a
19
combination of the two.
Utah can make its tax system internally
consistent not only by lowering taxes, but also by
raising taxes that residents pay on in-state
income. Specifically, Utah could increase the tax
rate on the in-state income of Utahns up to the
sum of the tax rate on nonresidents’ Utah income
and residents’ out-of-state income.20 For example,
if Utah were to increase the tax rate on residents’
domestic income from 5 percent to roughly 10
percent,21 Utah could retain its 5 percent tax rate
on Utahns’ foreign income and its 5 percent tax
rate on the Utah income of nonresidents. If such a
tax were universalized, then both foreign and instate income would be taxed at 10 percent.
Accordingly, such a tax system is internally

consistent in its treatment of foreign and in-state
income.
Such an approach, however, would impose a
higher tax on Utahns’ in-state income than is
necessary to achieve internal consistency
regarding interstate commerce. As a result, such a
tax would discourage Utah residents from
earning income in Utah as compared with
22
residents from other U.S. states. Such reverse
discrimination is not unconstitutional, but it is
not common, either, as it is politically
unpalatable.
Thus, there are several ways that Utah could
revise its tax laws without granting a tax credit on
foreign income so that its treatment of foreign
income was internally consistent. We next
examine the different ways that Utah could use
tax credits to achieve internal consistency.
Tax Credits
The final class of tax systems that satisfies
internal consistency is worldwide taxation with a
limited (or more generous) tax credit. A limited
tax credit is a credit offered by a residence state
for taxes paid to other jurisdictions on income
earned in other jurisdictions up to, but not
beyond, the taxpayer’s tentative tax liability to
23
the residence state on the same income. Income
tax systems with a limited tax credit (but no
more) are fairly common. There are at least two
ways that Utah could grant tax credits to Utah
residents with foreign income that would
arguably be consistent with the internal
consistency test:
• Option 6. Mirror image credit. States
(subnational political divisions) could
credit all taxes paid to foreign subnational
political entities but not taxes paid to
foreign national governments.
• Option 7. Residual credit. States could
credit foreign taxes paid (whether paid to
national governments or political
subdivisions) to the extent such taxes are

19

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1806.

20

See Knoll and Mason, supra note 18, at 341.

21

If the Utah tax rate on residents’ out-of-state and on nonresidents’
in-state income was 5 percent and Utah taxed its residents on their
worldwide income without allowing a deduction for taxes paid to other
states, then the tax rate on residents’ in-state income would have to rise
to 10 percent to achieve internal consistency. If, however, Utah allowed
residents a deduction for the taxes paid on foreign income, then the instate rate would have to rise to only 9.75 percent.

22

Such a tax would also provide Utahns with a tax-induced
advantage over nonresidents in earning income in other U.S. states.
23

No state offers an unlimited tax credit. Because such a system has
the potential to lead to massive refunds, at most states offer a limited
credit that would zero out the taxpayer’s liability to the residence state.
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not credited by the U.S. federal
government.
Option 6: Mirror Image Credit
Utah could follow the lead of some states and
municipalities after Wynne and adopt a mirror
image tax system for the credit. Under this
approach, Utah would credit taxes paid abroad if,
but only if, those taxes are assessed at a
subnational level similar to the level of the U.S.
states. Such a system, which is how Utah taxes
income earned by its residents in other U.S.
states, would be internally consistent. Such a
credit, however, would overcompensate Utah
residents whenever a resident’s federal credit had
already effectively compensated them for
24
subnational foreign taxes.
This possibility of a double credit might lead
Utah to restrict access to the credit. Utah might do
so directly by prohibiting double crediting of
subnational taxes. Such techniques implicate the
external consistency strand of tax discrimination,
which requires a reasonable connection between
the income the state seeks to tax and the income25
generating activities conducted in state.

Conclusion
Although the Utah tax system is internally
inconsistent and hence discriminates against
foreign commerce in violation of the dormant
foreign commerce clause, there are several
alternative means readily available to Utah to
modify its tax regime to eliminate that
discrimination and meet its constitutional
obligations.


Option 7: Residual Credit
An alternative approach to the foreign tax
credit would start with the recognition that a
dollar of tax is a dollar of tax whether it is
imposed at the national or subnational level.
Thus, it makes sense to provide a state credit for
taxes paid to foreign national and subnational
governments if those taxes have not already been
credited by the U.S. federal government. Such an
approach would allow a state credit once the
foreign national-plus-subnational tax rate
exceeded the federal rate. The Utah credit could
be limited by the federal tax rate plus the Utah tax
rate on in-state income. Such an approach is a
holistic approach to internal consistency; it
26
compares the full tax liability.

24

Utah residents would be overcompensated whenever foreign taxes
were less than federal taxes on the same income.
25

Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169.

26

For some taxpayers in some circumstances, this calculation can be
complex.
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